Can Facility Owners Face Liability for Abandonment?

Introduction

When a worker, customer, visitor, or other person is injured on company premises, the owner or safety officer may have duties beyond arranging medical assistance. Philippine criminal law may impose liability when a person who has a legal or factual ability to help instead leaves an injured person without assistance.

The offense commonly associated with this situation is abandonment of one’s victim under Article 275, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. However, facility ownership alone does not automatically establish criminal liability. The prosecution must prove the specific elements of the offense and the accused’s participation in the failure to assist.

What Is Abandonment of One’s Victim?

Article 275, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes anyone who fails to help or render assistance to another whom the accused has accidentally wounded or injured. The provision is found in the same article that also covers failure to assist a person found wounded or in danger of dying in an uninhabited place and failure to protect or deliver an abandoned child under seven years old.

The statutory penalty stated in Article 275 is arresto mayor. The applicable penalty and consequences should nevertheless be assessed against the current version of the Revised Penal Code, subsequent amendments, and the circumstances alleged and proved in the particular case.

Elements of the Offense

For abandonment of one’s victim under Article 275, paragraph 2, the prosecution generally must establish the following:

• The accused accidentally wounded or injured another person;
• The accused failed to help or render assistance to the injured person;
• The failure to assist was without sufficient legal justification; and
• The accused had the ability to provide assistance without exposing himself or herself to a comparable and serious danger.

The offense is distinct from reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries, homicide, or damage to property. The accidental character of the injury does not eliminate the separate duty imposed by Article 275 once the accused has caused the injury and thereafter failed to assist the victim.

Facility Ownership Does Not Automatically Create Criminal Liability

A building owner, company, administrator, or safety officer is not criminally liable under Article 275 merely because an accident occurred on company property. Criminal liability is personal and requires proof that the accused personally committed, directed, or knowingly participated in the failure to assist.

For example, a facility owner may not be liable under Article 275 solely because a visitor slipped in a lobby if the owner was not present, did not cause the injury, and had no personal involvement in the failure to provide assistance. The facts may support a civil action for negligence, but civil liability and criminal liability under Article 275 are separate inquiries.

Liability becomes more plausible when the owner, manager, security head, safety officer, or supervisor:

• personally caused the accident and then left the injured person;
• was present and expressly refused to summon medical or emergency assistance;
• had direct control over the premises and the emergency response;
• prevented employees or bystanders from helping the victim; or
• knowingly abandoned an injured person whom the accused had accidentally injured.

Supreme Court Ruling on Separate Criminal Offenses

In Lamera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93475, 30 September 1991, the Supreme Court held that reckless imprudence under Article 365 and abandonment of one’s victim under Article 275, paragraph 2 are separate offenses.

The Court explained that reckless imprudence is a quasi-offense committed through culpa, while abandonment of one’s victim is an offense against security committed through dolo. The failure to assist is not an element of reckless imprudence; under Article 365, it may instead increase the penalty when properly alleged and proved. By contrast, the failure to assist is itself the conduct punished under Article 275, paragraph 2.

Accordingly, a person may be prosecuted separately for causing injury through reckless imprudence and for subsequently failing to help the injured victim. The protection against double jeopardy does not apply where each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not.

Difference Between Article 275 and Article 365

Issue	Article 275, Paragraph 2	Article 365
Nature of offense	Abandonment of one’s victim	Reckless or simple imprudence
Required conduct	Failure to assist a person whom the accused accidentally injured	Reckless, imprudent, negligent, or inexcusable lack of precaution causing injury or other damage
Legal character	Crime against security	Quasi-offense
Relationship between offenses	May be charged separately from reckless imprudence	Failure to assist may increase the penalty if properly alleged and proved

Failure to Assist as a Penalty-Increasing Circumstance

Article 365 provides that the penalty next higher in degree may be imposed upon an offender who fails to lend the injured parties, on the spot, such help as may be in the offender’s hands to give.

In Ibabao v. People, G.R. No. 36957, 25 October 1984, the Supreme Court treated this failure to assist as a circumstance that increases the penalty by one degree. Because it changes the applicable penalty, the circumstance must be specifically alleged in the Information to adequately inform the accused of the charge.

This rule is different from a prosecution under Article 275, paragraph 2. Under Article 275, the failure to assist is the principal criminal conduct alleged. Under Article 365, the failure to assist may increase the penalty for the underlying quasi-offense, but it must be properly pleaded.

When May a Safety Officer Be Prosecuted?

A safety officer may face criminal exposure if the evidence shows that the officer personally had custody or control over the emergency response and deliberately failed to provide assistance after an accident that the officer caused or in which the officer participated.

Designation as a safety officer, however, is not by itself enough. The prosecution must connect the officer’s specific act or omission with the statutory elements of Article 275. A general failure to maintain safety equipment may support a negligence claim or another offense, but it does not automatically prove abandonment of one’s victim.

The following facts may be relevant:

• whether the safety officer was present when the injury occurred;
• whether the officer caused or contributed to the injury;
• whether the officer knew the extent of the victim’s condition;
• whether emergency assistance was reasonably available;
• whether the officer had authority to summon medical personnel or emergency responders; and
• whether providing assistance would have exposed the officer to serious danger.

Possible Liability of Employers and Corporations

A corporation acts through its officers, employees, and agents. The corporation itself is not ordinarily treated as the personal offender under Article 275 unless a special law expressly provides for corporate criminal liability. The individuals who performed or directed the prohibited act must generally be identified.

In criminal cases, an employer’s liability for a felony committed by an employee in the discharge of duties is generally subsidiary under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, rather than automatically solidary. In Calang v. People, G.R. No. 190696, 15 August 2010, the Supreme Court explained that this subsidiary liability arises only after the employee is found criminally liable and the statutory conditions, including insolvency where applicable, are established.

This criminal-law rule is distinct from civil liability under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. A company may incur civil liability for negligence even when the facts do not establish the personal criminal liability of the owner or safety officer under Article 275.

Civil Liability May Exist Even Without Article 275 Liability

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damage to another through fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage caused. Article 2180 extends responsibility to employers and to teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades, subject to the defense that the required diligence was exercised.

In University of Southeastern Philippines v. Sarate, G.R. No. 247617, 16 June 2025, the Supreme Court reiterated that schools and their responsible administrators may be held liable when negligent supervision and inadequate safety measures naturally and continuously lead to a student’s death. Although the case involved a university, its discussion illustrates the distinction between civil negligence and the narrower elements required for criminal abandonment.

Thus, a facility owner may face civil liability for failing to install safety measures, maintain emergency equipment, train personnel, or supervise operations even if the evidence does not show that the owner personally abandoned an injured victim within the meaning of Article 275.

Typical Situations

Injury caused by a facility employee. If an employee accidentally injures a visitor and immediately leaves without summoning available help, the employee may face liability under Article 275. The employer’s possible criminal or civil liability must be separately determined.

Owner absent from the premises. If the owner was not present, did not cause the injury, and had no participation in the failure to help, ownership alone will generally be insufficient to establish liability under Article 275.

Safety officer refuses assistance. If a safety officer is present, knows that a victim has been injured, has authority to call emergency responders, and deliberately refuses to do so after participating in the accident, the facts may support a prosecution, subject to proof of all statutory elements.

Emergency response is dangerous. Article 275 does not require a person to render assistance where doing so would expose that person to serious and comparable danger. The availability of safe alternatives, such as calling emergency responders or directing trained personnel to assist, remains relevant.

Evidence Relevant to a Criminal Complaint

A complaint involving Article 275 should identify the accused’s specific conduct rather than merely describe the accident. Useful evidence may include:

• closed-circuit television recordings;
• incident reports and security logs;
• messages, radio communications, or telephone records showing a refusal or delay in seeking help;
• witness testimony concerning the accused’s presence and instructions;
• medical records establishing the injury and the timing of assistance; and
• proof of the accused’s authority over emergency procedures.

The Information should clearly allege the accidental injury, the accused’s failure to assist, the circumstances showing the accused’s ability to help, and the absence of a valid reason for the omission. Where the prosecution also charges reckless imprudence, each offense should be stated with its own factual and legal basis.

Compliance Measures for Facility Owners

Facility owners and safety officers can reduce both injury risks and legal exposure by adopting written emergency procedures. These procedures should identify who must call emergency responders, who will administer first aid, who will preserve the scene, and who will notify management and the victim’s family.

They should also maintain functioning emergency equipment, conduct periodic drills, train designated personnel, preserve incident records, and prohibit employees from discouraging injured persons from seeking medical attention. A prompt and documented response does not automatically defeat a criminal complaint, but it may be important evidence concerning the existence or absence of an intentional failure to assist.

Final Observations

Article 275, paragraph 2 does not make every building owner or safety officer criminally responsible for an accident on company premises. The decisive questions are whether the accused accidentally injured the victim, personally failed to provide or procure available assistance, had the capacity to help, and lacked a legally sufficient reason for the omission.

The same incident may support separate proceedings for reckless imprudence, abandonment of one’s victim, civil negligence, or subsidiary employer liability, depending on the evidence and the allegations in the charging document. Facility owners should therefore treat emergency response as both a safety obligation and a legal responsibility, while investigators and prosecutors should distinguish personal criminal conduct from separate civil or employer-based liability.

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