This article talks about the prescriptive period for impugning the filiation of a child.
It is well-settled that an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child must be brought within the period prescribed by law.
This period is provided under Article 170 of the Family Code, which states:
“Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.”
This limitation also applies to the heirs of the husband, who may only impugn the child’s legitimacy under specific circumstances. This is provided under Article 171 of the Family Code:
“Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.”
However, what if the challenge is not merely to the child’s legitimacy, but to the filiation itself? What if the claim is that the child is not the biological child of the couple at all? Should the heirs still be bound by this prescriptive period?
The short answer is no.
In Eugenio San Juan Geronimo v. Karen Santos, G.R. No. 197099, 28 September 2015, the Supreme Court clarified that Article 170 of the Family Code applies only when the husband or his heirs are impugning the legitimacy of a child. It does not apply where the allegation is that the child is not the biological child of a particular couple, thus:
“The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code, declared Marissa as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente and Isabel. The appellate court reversed the RTC’s ruling holding that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. On appeal to this Court, we affirmed the reversal made by the appellate court, viz.:
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat- Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
“Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well taken.
This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.”
Similarly, the 2001 case of Labagala v. Santiago originated from a complaint for recovery of title, ownership and possession before the trial court. Respondents therein contended that petitioner is not the daughter of the decedent Jose and sought to recover from her the 1/3 portion of the subject property pertaining to Jose, but which came into petitioner’s sole possession upon Jose’s death. Respondents sought to prove that petitioner is not the daughter of the decedent as evidenced by her birth certificate which did not itself indicate the name of Jose as her father. Citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals and Article 263 of the Civil Code (now Article 170 of the Family Code), petitioner argued that respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally since the case was not an action impugning a child’s legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership and possession of property. We ruled in this case that petitioner’s reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code is misplaced and respondents may impugn the petitioner’s filiation in an action for recovery of title and possession. Thus, we affirmed the ruling of the appellate court that the birth certificate of petitioner Labagala proved that she “was born of different parents, not Jose and his wife.” Citing the aforecited cases of Benitez-Badua and Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we stated, viz.:
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man’s child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
x x x
Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in admitting secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Article 172 of the Family Code in this action for annulment of document and recovery of possession, we are constrained to rule after a meticulous examination of the evidence on record that all proof points to the conclusion that herein respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad.”
From the foregoing, it is clear that an action to impugn the filiation of a child—where the issue is not legitimacy, but whether the child is a biological offspring of the alleged parents—may be brought collaterally and at any time.
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